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Hattendorf and Boscawen: The Capture of Louisbourg, 1758

In addition, his use of nonstandard notations can render specific citations a little
fuzzy. This is a minor issue, however,
as Anderson’s synthesis is superb, his
analysis is sharp, and his writing style is
engaging. All in all, this is a very useful
contribution to the body of work, one
that helps foster a better understanding
of the dynamics shaping today’s Arab
Spring and beyond. Given America’s
track record in the region, anything that
helps broaden our understanding of the
Middle East can only be a good thing.
THOMAS E. SEAL, COLONEL, U.S. MARINE CORPS,
RETIRED

Stafford, Virginia

Boscawen, Hugh. The Capture of Louisbourg,
1758. Campaigns and Commanders. Norman:
Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 2011. 504pp. $39.95

The British amphibious operation to
capture the French fortress at Louisbourg in Canada during the Seven Years’
War was the largest joint operation undertaken by British forces in that period.
This major event in naval history has
not been overlooked by historians, but
no one until Colonel Hugh Boscawen,
British Army (Ret.), has been able so
effectively to combine the skills of an experienced army officer with those of an
insightful modern historian in analyzing
this campaign and its commanders.
A direct descendant of the British naval
commander at the capture of Louisbourg, Admiral the Honorable Edward
Boscawen, Colonel Hugh Boscawen
brings his own experience of thirty years
of active military service in the Coldstream Guards to bear on the subject,
with his knowledge of modern-day
campaign planning and execution. Such
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credentials might have led an author
in the wrong direction, resulting in an
anachronistic and hagiographic tale full
of modern military jargon. However, in
Hugh Boscawen’s hands they have led
to a model of careful historical scholarship informed by professional military
understanding, experience at sea as a
yachtsman, and access to family papers.
Starting out from the key conceptual
point that campaigns and commanders should be seen in the context of the
aims, ways, and means of their own day,
Boscawen has carefully and judiciously
examined the subject. Over many years,
he made a thorough study of both the
published English- and the published
French-language scholarship. Going
much farther and deeper, he examined
in detail the extensive public and private
records in four French and eight British
archival depositories, as well as other
primary-source materials in Canada,
the United States, and private hands.
Colonel Boscawen opens his study with
an overview of the strategic situation
that the competing powers of Britain
and France faced in the period immediately leading up to 1758, and of the
contrasting organization of those governments and their leaders. Boscawen
goes on to examine the background to
the construction of the French fortification at Louisbourg, ranging from the
reorganization of the defense of New
France following the Peace of Utrecht
in 1713 to the perception on both
sides that Louisbourg had become an
important trading point, the key bastion
in the defense of the Saint Lawrence
River and Quebec, as well as the French
fisheries on the Grand Banks. When
war broke out again between the two
countries in 1755, neither was immediately prepared to react decisively.
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Colonel Boscawen traces the initial planning for the Louisbourg campaign up to
August and September 1757, when the
Select Committee of the Privy Council
in London began to look at priorities
for the next campaigning season. By
December a campaign plan had emerged
and operational planning had begun;
meanwhile, the French were taking their
own action to strengthen their position
in Canada. The British assault force
began to gather at Halifax in April, while
snow was still on the ground. By 2 May
Admiral Boscawen had arrived, immediately selecting key land and sea officers
to form a joint staff to plan the landing.
Such a staff was a remarkable innovation, for which the need had already
been made clear in earlier eighteenthcentury British experience. Among several initiatives this group took were joint
operational training and a system of operational control for the landing boats.
In eighteen days in May 1758 at Halifax,
fourteen British regiments, artillery,
rangers, and the fleet were transformed
into a cohesive expeditionary force.

Once ashore, Brigadier James Wolfe was
able to gauge the range of the fortress’s
guns and to locate the initial position
that Amherst would use for the first
parallel in the siege that ensued. Turning
to the French side, Boscawen follows the
French as they defended their position.
He then traces the action in two parts—
the siege, between 1 and 15 July, and
the bombardment, from 16 to 27 July.

Colonel Boscawen provides a detailed
description of the initial assault landing, under the command of the newly
arrived Major General Jeffery Amherst.
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As Colonel Boscawen points out, British success at Louisbourg marked the
beginning of the end of New France,
and it also began a series of British joint
amphibious operations during the remainder of the war. It also showed early
signs of the coming changes in military
affairs, marked by increasingly organized industrial and agricultural support
for larger armed forces. Boscawen’s
study is a model of historical analysis,
judiciously dealing with both sides of
this joint operation in military and
naval dimensions. It is a major contribution to understanding an eighteenthcentury amphibious operation.
JOHN B. HATTENDORF
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